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 1 
Corporate Reporting on Corruption: An International Comparison 
 
 
Abstract 
Building on an institutionalist framework of the various organizational field-level pressures 
on firms to engage with the challenge of corruption, we analyse anti-corruption disclosures 
across a sample of 933 sustainability reports. Such reporting complements anti-corruption 
initiatives, as it allows the company to demonstrate its commitment. Our results show clear 
country- and sector-level differences in the extent to which companies communicate their 
anti-corruption engagement. However, the more a company is exposed to corruption, the less 
likely it appears to openly communicate its anti-corruption engagement. Hence, our results 
cast doubt on the effectiveness of anti-corruption disclosures as part of wider sustainability 
reporting. 
 
Keywords 
Anti-corruption; institutional theory; international comparison; organizational fields; 
sustainability reporting 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
International trade and investment have accelerated tremendously during the last decades, but 
their growth has also been accompanied by an internationalization of corruption (Sanyal, 
2005). Corruption is, in simple terms, the abuse of authority for private benefit (Rodriguez, 
Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006). Corruption matters because, at the firm level, it inflicts 
uncertainty and additional costs on business; at the societal level, it weakens societal 
institutions like courts and regulatory agencies, diverts funds away from food, health care, 
poverty alleviation or education projects, slows economic growth and misdirects 
entrepreneurial talent (Heywood & Rose, 2014; Rodriguez, et al., 2006; Svensson, 2005; 
Tanzi, 1995). At the same time, the private sector has also been a major source of corruption 
in many countries, whether these are actions that benefit the company, such as bribing civil 
*Manuscript (with Author Details removed)
Click here to view linked References
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 2 
servants to obtain public contracts, or actions that benefit individuals within the company, 
such as nepotism in personnel recruitment (Argandoña, 2001; Sikka & Lehman, 2015). 
 
Hence the quality of corporate reporting practices – both the disclosure of financial and 
additional information on the firm’s social and environmental performance as well as the 
auditing of this information – have an important role to play in constraining corruption 
(Kimbro, 2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Countries that have more transparent reporting 
standards and a higher concentration of accountants were thus found to be less corrupt 
(Malagueño, Albrecht, Ainge, & Stephens, 2010; Wu, 2005). The prior accounting literature 
on corruption predominantly falls into three categories: it is either largely conceptual (e.g. 
Everett, Neu, & Rahaman, 2007), or it discusses individual cases of corruption (e.g. Sharma 
& Lawrence, 2015), or it utilises relatively small samples of countries (e.g. 61 countries in 
Kimbro, 2002). By contrast, this paper offers a cross-national study of firms from all five 
continents. 
 
More specifically, the paper focuses on the extent to which companies openly communicate 
their engagement with corruption. Through publicly reporting its anti-corruption initiatives, a 
company can demonstrate its commitment to addressing this challenge, thus giving more 
credibility to its efforts as well as raising awareness of corruption-related problems. 
Communicating on anti-corruption measures is therefore an important complement to a 
company’s actual engagement in anti-corruption initiatives. Based on this logic, anti-
corruption measures have become a key part of sustainability reporting and have become a 
standard element of mainstream reporting guidelines, such as those by the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI). At the same time, corporate reporting on anti-corruption may not lend itself 
easily to voluntary, beyond compliance sustainability reporting. Given the nature of the 
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 3 
problem, companies may choose to avoid the topic as part of their sustainability disclosures 
rather than proactively and transparently addressing the issue. Hence, we explore how 
companies address anti-corruption as part of their sustainability reporting, and compare and 
contrast anti-corruption reporting to the disclosure of other sustainability-related aspects. 
 
The paper makes a number of contributions to the literature on corporate engagement in anti-
corruption measures. First, we do find patterns in terms of country- and sector-level 
differences in reporting on anti-corruption; more specifically, reporting appears to be 
negatively related to the degree to which companies are exposed to corrupt practices. In other 
words, the higher the likelihood that a company is exposed to corrupt practices, the less likely 
it is to communicate its anti-corruption engagement. Secondly, we also find that specific anti-
corruption initiatives, like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), are much 
more effective in encouraging companies to openly engage with the issue than generalist 
ones, such as the United Nations Global Compact. Both findings have significant 
repercussions for the future design of CSR initiatives. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section defines corruption and briefly outlines its 
enormous costs to firms and wider society before introducing key government, multi-
stakeholder and corporate initiatives in this area. Thereafter, the prior literature on corruption 
and corporate reporting is reviewed briefly. This is followed by a section that outlines the 
theoretical basis of the paper in institutional theory and develops a set of hypotheses to guide 
the analysis in the remainder of the paper. Thereafter, the methodological details of the 
quantitative study that underlies the paper are presented. The results section then presents the 
findings from the various statistical analyses. In concluding, the most important implications 
of the paper’s findings for academic research and management practice in the area of anti-
 1 
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 4 
corruption are discussed, its limitations are outlined as well as directions drawn out for future 
research into the role of businesses in society across different national settings. 
 
2. The Nature of Corruption 
Corruption occurs where decision-makers violate their duty to act in a neutral and impartial 
manner to pursue societal welfare and, instead, aim to generate benefits for themselves or for 
closely related persons. This duty requires that “personal or other relationships should play no 
role in economic decisions that involve more than one party” (Tanzi, 1995, p. 161), in other 
words that decisions should be made at arm’s length. Thus corruption can be defined in a 
generic fashion as “the intentional non-compliance with the arm’s-length principle aimed at 
deriving some advantage for oneself or for related individuals from this behavior” (Tanzi, 
1995, p. 167).
 1
 
  
The costs of corruption at both societal and firm level are well documented by now (Bardhan, 
1997; Doh, et al., 2003; Galang, 2012; Hess & Dunfee, 2000; Heywood & Rose, 2014; Jain, 
2001; Svensson, 2005). To start with, corruption imposes significant additional costs on firms 
and private individuals (Galang, 2012; Luo, 2002). According to estimates by the World 
Bank, world-wide bribery costs at least US$ 1 trillion a year (Rose-Ackermann, 2004). 
Corruption also imposes non-monetary costs in the forms of bureaucratic delay, greater 
information processing difficulty and heightened uncertainty (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Luo, 
2011). Economic actors face further costs when, because of corruption, they are unable to use 
societal institutions such as courts for the enforcement of contracts (Bardhan, 1997; 
Svensson, 2005). At a societal level, corruption is likely to reduce public expenditure, 
because economic activity outside the official economy generates less tax revenues, if any at 
                                                 
1
  Another often cited definition defines corruption as the “abuse (or misuse) of public power for private 
(personal) benefit” (Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins, & Eden, 2003: 115). 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 
 5 
all; predatory behaviour by corrupt politicians thus diverts funding away from education, 
health care and infrastructure projects (Mauro, 1998; Svensson, 2005). Corruption weakens 
key societal institutions, like courts and regulatory agencies, hence perpetuating the situation 
(Doh, et al., 2003). Furthermore, corruption has adverse effects on economic growth as it 
tends to reduce investment due to the additional operational inefficiencies (Bardhan, 1997; 
Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Mauro, 1995). In addition to hampering economic growth, 
corruption can also influence the distribution of income within a society (Jain, 2001). In 
particular, the poorest in a society are the least likely to have resources for bribing and are 
hence further disadvantaged (Bardhan, 1997). 
 
Anti-corruption measures have traditionally been in the domain of government legislation. 
Some countries have legislation in place that applies to the international operations of MNEs 
headquartered within their borders (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008a), such as the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) in the United States or the Bribery Act 2010 in the United Kingdom. 
The FCPA also served as a model for the OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which came into force in 
1999. Similarly, the United Nations adopted a Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 
2003 and added anti-corruption to the original nine principles of its Global Compact. 
Notwithstanding these regulatory efforts, anti-corruption legislation still suffers from 
implementation deficits at national and cross-national levels (Cragg & Woof, 2002; Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2008b). Hence softer governance mechanisms have emerged to fill this gap, in 
particular at the international level. These include high-profile multi-stakeholder initiatives, 
for example the Publish What You Pay Initiative (PWYP), the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), the World Economic Forum’s Partnering Against Corruption 
Initiative (PACI), or the Wolfsberg Principles. Governmental and intergovernmental 
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 6 
initiatives, like the OECD and UN ones, have thus increasingly been supplemented with 
initiatives by the private sector itself. 
 
3. Corruption and Corporate Reporting 
Corruption is an important topic for management and accounting scholars. As the purpose of 
accounting is to provide information on the financial, and increasingly also social and 
environmental performance of a company, its role also includes the provision of data that are 
essential to the control and prevention of corrupt activities. Greater transparency in company 
reporting thus leads to a higher probability of corrupt acts being detected, which reduces the 
information asymmetry between principals and agents and enables shareholders and other 
stakeholders to make more informed decisions (Wu, 2005). Accounting can play a dual role 
here: on the one hand, financial reporting provides information about transactions, extended 
by sustainability reporting to their social and environmental impact; on the other hand, 
auditing serves as a monitoring mechanism to check on the accuracy of this information, 
hence discouraging financial misappropriation (Kimbro, 2002). 
 
Accounting scholars have examined corruption from three major perspectives. First, there are 
conceptual studies. For example, Everett, Neu and Rahaman (2007) draw on Foucauldian 
governmentality to distinguish between two framings of the global fight against corruption 
and the role of accounting in it. An orthodox framing, as is evident in publications by major 
anticorruption organisations like the World Bank, the OECD or Transparency International, 
presents the contribution of accounting to the struggle against corruption as a relatively 
straightforward endeavour. By contrast, a radical framing hones in on class-, race- and 
gender-based subjectivities of this struggle to suggest that accounting may also facilitate, 
rather than combat corruption (see also Sikka, 2010). A second stream of the literature 
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 7 
examines individual cases of corruption in detail. As an example, Sharma and Lawrence 
(2015) analysed the privatization of Telecom Fiji and argue that the privatization process, 
carried out with technical support of accounting consultants, led to a redistribution of wealth 
in favour of the political elite, rather than improved organizational performance or enhanced 
wellbeing of ordinary citizens. A third group of studies statistically examines the link 
between the level of corruption in a country and various socio-economic and cultural factors, 
but also including the quality of accounting. For instance, Kimbro (2002) finds that countries 
with well enforced laws, an effective judicial system, good financial reporting standards and 
a wide availability of accountants display lower levels of corruption. 
 
Closely related to the role of accountants and accounting in the fight against corruption is the 
question of how companies communicate their engagement with this challenge. Public 
reporting of a company’s commitment to anti-corruption measures can increase awareness of 
the issue among internal and external stakeholders, and in turn gives a company’s anti-
corruption engagement more credibility, as it allows its stakeholder to scrutinize the 
company’s efforts (Clark & Hebb, 2005). Hence anti-corruption measures have become part 
and parcel of corporate reporting on social and environmental impacts. In this context, the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) has emerged as the key normative body. To date, several 
thousand companies have used the GRI Reporting Guidelines as guidance for their 
sustainability reports; in 2010, 82% of Fortune Global 250 companies adhered to the GRI 
Guidelines (KPMG, 2013). The guidelines stipulate generic principles for the publishing of 
sustainability reports as well as a set of 79 performance indicators referring to six 
sustainability-related dimensions, namely economic performance (9 indicators), 
environmental impact (30), labour practices and decent work (14), human rights (9), society 
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 8 
(8) and product responsibility (9). As part of the ‘society’ category, three indicators are 
specifically dedicated to a company’s engagement in anti-corruption initiatives: 
 SO2: Percentage and total number of business units analysed for risks related to 
corruption (henceforth “Corruption Analysis”). 
 SO3: Percentage of employees trained in organization’s anti-corruption policies and 
procedures (“Corruption Training”) 
 SO4: Actions taken in response to incidents of corruption (“Corruption Responses”). 
All three are classified as core indicators; thus any company publishing a sustainability report 
along GRI guidelines is expected to address them. Table 1 provides illustrative examples of 
how companies within the sample have addressed the three corruption-related GRI indicators. 
_______________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
_______________________________ 
 
4. Theory and Hypothesis Development 
The question of how firms report on their engagement with corruption can be addressed 
through institutional theory, which has repeatedly been drawn upon in the accounting 
literature (e.g. Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Dirsmith, Heian, & Covaleski, 1997; Lounsbury, 
2008). The theory is particularly appropriate for this question as it provides a theoretical 
explanation of how firms respond to non-market pressures, such as governmental, societal 
and cultural ones (Oliver, 1991; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005). Although there is no 
single accepted approach (Scott, 2014), institutionalism seeks to address the question of how 
the behaviour of societal actors is affected by institutions, i.e. by “formal and informal rules, 
regulations, norms, and understandings that constrain and enable behaviour” (Morgan, 
Campbell, Crouch, Pedersen, & Whitley, 2010, p. 3). Institutional theory sees organizations, 
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 9 
such as a firm, as being embedded in a multitude of relations with external actors (Dacin, 
Ventresca, & Beal, 1999). Collectively these make up an organizational field, which 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p 148) define as “those organizations that, in the aggregate, 
constitute a recognized area of institutional life”, i.e. that are linked together through frequent 
interactions, information flows, and mutual identification as members of the field (see also 
Scott, 2014).  In order to gain access to resources that are imperative for their survival, 
organisations must maintain legitimacy in the eyes of field constituents and hence subject 
themselves to isomorphic pressures.  
 
However, organizations are not just passive recipients; rather they may have varying degrees 
of freedom to enact strategic responses to institutional pressures (Greenwood, Raynard, 
Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011; Oliver, 1991; 
Seo & Creed, 2002). As the organizational field “forms around a central issue” (Hoffman, 
2001, p. 135), there is room for vastly different conceptualizations of the field, e.g. around 
specific technologies or dominant organizations. The literature has thus recognized that firms, 
in particular MNEs, “face multiple, fragmented, nested, or often conflicting institutional 
environments” (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008, p. 998). Building on the argument by Smith 
and Meiksins (1995) that any company is subject to three sources of external influence on its 
organizational practices, namely those arising (i) from the economic mode of its production, 
(ii) from national legacies in its country and (iii) from the global diffusion of ‘best practice’ 
or universal modernization strategies, we argue that the organizational environment for 
corporate engagement with anti-corruption initiatives can equally be conceptualized in three 
different ways, as country level pressures, as sectoral pressures level and as pressures for 
global standardization. In other words, the sector and the home country a company is 
embedded in are likely to exert field-level pressures that shape the extent, nature and content 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 
 10 
of its engagement with corruption. In addition, companies are subject to further field-level 
pressures exerted by global anti-corruption initiatives. 
 
4.1. Country Level and Regional Level Pressures 
A number of studies have shown how countries differ in terms of the amount of corruption 
they experience (Baughn, Bodie, Buchanan, & Bixby, 2010; Cullen, Parboteeah, & Hoegl, 
2004; Husted, 1999; Jain, 2001; Mauro, 1995; Sanyal, 2005; Treisman, 2000). These 
differences have been linked to differences in countries’ economic development (Baughn, et 
al., 2010; Cullen, et al., 2004; Husted, 1999; Sanyal, 2005), where corruption generally tends 
to be more widespread in countries with lower income levels (Svensson, 2005; note, 
however, the critique that there may be a Western bias in defining and measuring corruption, 
see e.g. de Maria, 2008). In addition, the quality of political institutions has been found to 
influence corruption levels (Cullen, et al., 2004). Crucially, in democratic societies, voters 
have the opportunity to vote corrupt politicians out of office (Jain, 2001), while the presence 
of watchdogs like Transparency International ensures better information flows on corrupt 
practices (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Another key influence on corruption are a society’s 
cultural values and moral code (Baughn, et al., 2010; Cullen, et al., 2004; Sanyal, 2005; 
Treisman, 2000). For example, three of Hofstede’s variables – high uncertainty avoidance, 
high masculinity, and high power distance – were found to explain high levels of corruption 
(Husted, 1999). Likewise, cultures with a strong emphasis on hierarchy were found to exhibit 
higher levels of corruption whereas egalitarian cultures correlate with lower levels (Akbar & 
Vujić, 2014). As Spencer and Gomez (2011, p. 281) argue, “characteristics of corruption can 
become so institutionalized that they become fundamental components of a country’s 
institutional environment”; hence they exert isomorphic pressure on a firm to accept these.  
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Equally, country-of-origin effects have for some time now been identified in corporate 
sustainability reporting (for recent overviews see Fifka, 2013; Fortanier, Kolk, & Pinkse, 
2011). Whilst the vast majority of international comparative studies on sustainability 
reporting tended to focus on country-level and regional-level differences in or between North 
America and Europe (Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Halme & Huse, 1997; Kolk, 2005), more 
recent studies have also focused on developing and emerging economies (Baskin, 2006; 
Belal, Cooper, & Roberts, 2013; Chapple & Moon, 2005). Clear differences have been 
identified in terms of the likelihood of reporting (Halme & Huse, 1997; Kolk, 2010), report 
content (Baskin, 2006; Kolk, 2005) and the likelihood of assurance as well as the choice of 
assurance provider (Kolk & Perego, 2010).  
 
To an extent, these differences stem from differences in reporting legislation at the level of 
the nation state (Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Kolk, Walhain, & Van de Wateringen, 2001) and 
the regional level (see e.g. recent EU-level developments in this context). At the same time, 
the existence or salience of specific pressure groups (Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998; Van 
der Laan Smith, Adhikari, & Tondkar, 2005) as well as underlying cultural and institutional 
contexts (Fortanier, et al., 2011; Kolk, 2005) have also been argued to result in country-level 
and regional-level differences in sustainability reporting. At a more general level, similar 
patterns have been identified between different world regions, both in terms of the nature of 
corporate social responsibility (Matten & Moon, 2008) more generally as well as the content 
of corporate sustainability disclosures (Kolk, 2005; Authors 1 & 2, 2012, 2015).  
 
For the purposes of this research, we focus on regional-level differences in anti-corruption 
reporting. Building on international comparative studies in the context of corruption and of 
sustainability reporting, we hypothesize that similar regional-level patterns, i.e. patterns 
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 12 
resulting from the extent to which companies are exposed to corruption, will emerge with 
regard to the question whether companies openly communicate about corruption. 
Hypothesis 1. There will be regional-level differences in terms of the extent to which 
companies communicate their anti-corruption engagement. 
 
4.2. Sectoral Level Pressures 
Secondly, we expect sector-level dynamics to shape the extent to which a company reports on 
its anti-corruption engagement. Corruption differs between sectors as some industry 
structures provide a more suitable context for corruption than others (Luo, 2011; Moran, 
1999). In the words of Spector (2005, p. 6): “One of the best ways to understand the spread of 
corruption and what can be done to control it, is by analysing its impact sector-by-sector.” 
For example, construction involves complex, non-standard activities where the quality of the 
completed project can be difficult to assess. Companies in the sector are furthermore closely 
linked to government, as a considerable portion of public investment goes to construction. 
Under these conditions, it is no surprise that the “construction industry is consistently ranked 
as one of the most corrupt industries worldwide” (Kenny, 2009, p. 21; see also Golden & 
Picci, 2006; 2009). Similarly, the extractive industry is shaped by a number of conditions that 
make it riper for corruption than other industries. Firms have little choice over locations; they 
have to go where the respective resources are. Such geographic luck provides rent-seeking 
corrupt governments with the upper hand, as several multinationals, all with the necessary 
capital and know-how to exploit the resources, are jockeying with each other for concessions 
(O’Higgins, 2006). 
 
Similarly, a range of studies have identified sector-specific differences in corporate non-
financial reporting (Fortanier, et al., 2011; Halme & Huse, 1997; Holder-Webb, Cohen, Nath, 
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& Wood, 2009; Kolk & Perego, 2010; Neu, et al., 1998; Patten, 1991). Sector-specific 
aspects include the extent to which a company from a specific sector is exposed to public 
scrutiny (Bowen, 2000; Patten, 1991), the extent to which it modifies the environment 
(Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Dierkes & Preston, 1977), the frequency of critical incidents or 
accidents occurring in the industry and related public pressure (Neu, et al., 1998), or an 
exposure to specific sustainability-related issues (Halme & Huse, 1997). In parallel to these 
findings, we would expect to find a link between sector affiliation and the extent to which 
companies communicate their anti-corruption engagement. For example, construction firms 
might address anti-corruption differently from other sectors given that the construction 
industry is widely perceived as being particularly prone to corrupt practices. Thus, we 
hypothesize that pressures to communicate openly about corruption will be linked to the 
extent to which different sectors are exposed to corrupt practices: 
Hypothesis 2. There will be industry-level differences in terms of the extent to which 
companies communicate their anti-corruption engagement. 
 
4.3. Global Pressures 
A third source of isomorphic pressure on how companies engage with corruption are the 
recent fundamental changes in the global business context. “Issues that can affect the 
functioning of effective markets in one region of the world can now affect the entire global 
market; corruption is finally being recognized as one of those issues” (Hess & Dunfee, 2000, 
p. 600). Interaction between civil society, national policy elites and international pressures 
has led in many countries to the emergence of a veritable anti-corruption industry (Sampson, 
2010). Translated to the organizational level, Luo (2006) found that firms with a great 
emphasis on the implementation of CSR tools, such as codes of conduct and other corporate 
policies pertaining to major stakeholders, responded to increasing corruption by reducing 
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their social connections with governmental officials, whereas firms with a lower emphasis on 
CSR tools actually increased the use of their social ties with government officials. 
 
As discussed above, a range of initiatives have emerged that are dedicated to the fight against 
corruption. Whilst participation in anti-corruption initiatives might not necessarily be linked 
to a more sincere engagement with the topic but rather reflect a symbolic engagement 
(Heugens & Lander, 2009), a number of factors such as organizational learning (Ruggie, 
2002) or increased exposure to stakeholders and thus greater pressure to act may indeed 
trigger a company’s engagement with a given issue. Participation in anti-corruption initiatives 
may thus exert a positive influence on corruption-related reporting. For the purposes of this 
paper, these initiatives can be grouped into two categories.  
 
On the one hand, there are broad initiatives in the context of CSR and corporate citizenship 
which promote corporate engagement with corruption as part of a wider array of aspects 
concerning the role of business in society. A key initiative here is the UN Global Compact. 
Anti-corruption is specified as the 10
th
 Global Compact Principle alongside a range of other 
issues, such as human rights, labour rights, child labour and environmental sustainability 
(UNGC, 2015). In general terms, the UN Global Compact has been found to have a positive 
impact on the comprehensiveness of CSR reporting (Chen & Bouvain, 2009; Fortanier, et al., 
2011). On the other hand, there are narrow initiatives that focus specifically on anti-
corruption activities. Key examples here are the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (COST), the World Economic 
Forum’s Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) and the Wolfsberg Principles. As 
transparency, accountability as well as interaction and communication with stakeholders are 
at the core of all of these initiatives, we would expect that corporate engagement with these 
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initiatives has a positive impact on corruption-related reporting practices (COST, 2015; EITI, 
2015; PACI, 2015). More formally: 
Hypothesis 3. Participation in multi-stakeholder initiatives dedicated to anti-
corruption will make it more likely that a company publically 
communicates it anti-corruption commitment. 
 
5. Research Methods 
5.1. Sample Selection 
We will test our hypotheses through an analysis of 933 GRI G3
2
 corporate sustainability 
reports from seven sectors (banking; construction; electricity; industrial metals; mining; oil & 
gas and finally gas, water & multi-utilities) which were published in the years 2006-2009. 
These reports were identified through the Corporate Register database, a repository of 
corporate sustainability reports (www.corporateregister.com). As country of origin and sector 
affiliation are two central dimensions in this study, we only considered those countries and 
sectors for which a minimum number of reports were available (10 per country; 25 reports 
per sector). This enabled us to ensure a sufficient size of country and sector subsamples. For 
the identification of sectors, we followed the classification used on the Corporate Register 
website. All seven sectors included in the sample are to varying degrees exposed to corrupt 
business practices. According to the Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey (2008, 
2011), oil & gas, mining and in particular construction represent high-risk sectors in terms of 
Bribe Payers Index (BPI) scores; industrial metals, gas, water and multi-utilities as well as 
electricity occupy middle ground positions; and banking represents a low-risk sector in this 
context (nevertheless, corruption undoubtedly exists in banking & finance too – as can be 
illustrated by a number of recent high-profile scandals). 
                                                 
2
 G3 refers to the third generation of the GRI Guidelines. 
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As the GRI G3 Guidelines were launched in 2006 and were replaced by their successor G4 in 
2010, the final sample consists of documents reporting on the years 2006-2009. The initial 
sample consisted of 1,118 sustainability reports, which subsequently underwent screening. As 
the analysis focused on reporting on the three corruption-related GRI G3 indicators, those 
reports that did not follow the GRI reporting format – and therefore could not be coded – 
were excluded from the sample. In total, the final sample consists of 933 GRI G3 reports 
from 30 countries (Table 2). In terms of sectors, banking represents the largest sector within 
the sample (n=209), followed by electricity (188), gas, water & multi-utilities (139), 
construction (138), mining (98), oil & gas (98) and industrial metals (63). With regard to 
country of origin, Spain constitutes the largest subsample (n=142), followed by Brazil (79), 
Italy (75), the US (56) and Australia (55). 
_______________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
_______________________________ 
 
5.2. Variables 
Coverage of GRI indicators SO2, SO3 and SO4 was used as the dependent variable. Hence, 
three sets of logistic regressions were performed. Table 3 presents the variables used in the 
analysis. Sector affiliation and region of origin were used as independent variables to indicate 
sectoral and regional-level differences in anti-corruption reporting. Likewise, Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) scores were included as an independent variable in order to capture 
country-level variations in the exposure to corruption. Furthermore, (a) UN Global Compact 
participation as well as (b) participation in EITI, COST, PACI and the Wolfsberg Principles 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 
 17 
was included to identify the impact of relevant multi-stakeholder initiatives on reporting on 
corruption.  
 
In addition, a number of further independent variables were included in the analysis. Levels 
of socio-economic development have previously been found to impact the likelihood of 
reporting as well as the content of these disclosures (Fifka, 2013). For the purposes of this 
research, Human Development Index (HDI) scores (UNDP, 2015) were used to indicate 
levels of socio-economic development in the 30 countries included in the analysis. In 
addition, company size (Holder-Webb, et al., 2009; Patten, 1991) and internationalization 
(Chapple & Moon, 2005; Vormedal & Ruud, 2009) have long been identified as drivers of 
corporate sustainability disclosures. Both of these aspects were operationalized using 
employee data. Given the diversity of companies included in the sample (both in terms of 
geographic location and ownership), financial performance information was not readily 
available through standard databases such as Thomson. In contrast, employee data could be 
collected from corporate sustainability disclosures for all 933 reports as this is a standard GRI 
indicator. The ratio of companies’ foreign employees divided by the total number of 
employees was used to indicate the degree of internationalization, modelled on the ratio of 
foreign sales to total sales (FSTS) as a standard measure in this context (Sullivan, 1994).  
 
Another two variables were used to capture a company’s reporting regime: (a) the number of 
GRI G3 reports published by the company up to and including the report at hand and (b) the 
overall number of other (non-corruption-related) indicators addressed by each company in a 
specific report. Whilst the number of GRI reports a company has already published may 
indicate corporate learning over time and thus result in an ‘upwards harmonization’ of 
reporting (Fortanier, et al., 2011); the overall number of other GRI indicators may indicate 
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the extent to which a company has engaged with the GRI guidelines, which in turn may 
influence the likelihood of the company to report on the three anti-corruption-related 
indicators as well (Author 1 et al., 2015). Finally, the models used to produce the results were 
tested for robustness and compared to more complex models taking into account company-
level random effects and publication year of the report. 
_______________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
_______________________________ 
 
5.3. Data Analysis 
The GRI content index of each of the 933 reports was transcribed into an SPSS database for 
subsequent analysis. Each indicator that was stated to be “fully” or “partially” addressed in 
the report was assigned the value 1; all indicators not addressed in the report were marked as 
0. Only the generic set of 76 GRI G3 indicators was considered (46 of which are specified as 
‘core’ and 30 as ‘additional’ indicators; the three corruption-related ‘core’ indicators SO2, 
SO3, SO4 were not considered here as they form the dependent variables in the logistic 
regressions); supplementary indicators as developed by the GRI for particular industries were 
not included. In an initial step of the analysis, a descriptive statistical analysis was performed, 
which focused on mean coverage levels across the total sample and on coverage levels for 
each indicator category. Subsequently, a series of binary logistic regression analyses was 
performed to identify how the different independent variables have influenced a company’s 
likelihood of addressing the corruption-related GRI G3 indicators SO2-SO4. 
 
6. Results 
6.1. Overall Patterns 
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Table 4 summarizes the results of the descriptive analysis of the 933 GRI G3 reports. In 
terms of total coverage, companies across the whole sample addressed an average of 57% of 
all the 79 indicators. Looking at the seven different sectors included in the sample, 
construction and banking emerge as clear outliers: here, a markedly lower number of 
indicators are addressed when compared to the other sectors. The remaining sectors show 
very similar coverage levels of around 60%. By contrast, very clear regional differences can 
be identified across the sample, ranging from North American as well as Eastern and 
Northern European reports with coverage levels of less than 50%, to the East Asian and 
South Asian subsamples with coverage levels of over 65%.  
_______________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
_______________________________ 
 
All three corruption-related indicators in the GRI G3 guidelines have been specified as core 
indicators; one would therefore expect them to be addressed more frequently than all other 76 
GRI indicators on average. Whilst this is the case, coverage is only slightly higher with 
values ranging from 58% (SO4: Corruption Responses) through 60% (SO2: Corruption 
Analysis) to 62% (SO3: Corruption Training). However, clear differences in the corruption-
related indicators within the overall sample can be identified with regard to region of origin, 
largely reflecting the patterns observed above. Exceptions to these overall trends are the 
relatively high levels of coverage of corruption training (SO3) in the North American 
subsample (63%) or the extremely low levels of coverage of corruption analysis and training 
in the Eastern European subsample (SO2: 16%; SO3: 16%). By contrast, sector-level 
differences are more modest across all three corruption-related indicators. 
_______________________________ 
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INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
_______________________________ 
 
Table 5 shows a correlation matrix for the variables that have been used in the logistic 
regression analyses. It should be noted that very high levels of correlation exist between 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores and Human Development Index (HDI) scores for 
the company’s country of origin. Relatively high levels of correlation can also be identified in 
the case of internationalization and number of employees as well as between 
internationalization and membership of initiatives dedicated to anti-corruption. 
 
6.2. Results of Logistic Regression Analyses 
_______________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
_______________________________ 
 
Tables 6-8 summarize the results of the three logistic regression analyses. In all three cases, 
model fit is relatively high with R-squared values (Hosmer & Lemeshow) of .33 (SO3: 
Corruption Training) through .37 (SO2: Corruption Analysis) to .38 (SO4: Corruption 
Responses). Table 6 contains the data on Indicator SO2 (Corruption Analysis). For six of the 
independent variables, significant relationships can be identified. First of all, mining 
companies show significantly lower coverage compared to the reference group electricity, 
whereas the banking sector shows significantly higher coverage. In terms of regional-level 
variation across the sample, only Eastern European companies show a significant deviance 
from the reference group of Mediterranean European companies with clearly lower coverage. 
A general pattern that emerges is that the more indicators a company reports on – measured 
in terms of coverage of all 76 non-corruption-related GRI indicators – the more likely it is to 
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report on indicator SO2 too. Likewise, the higher the number of GRI G3 sustainability reports 
a company has published prior to the report at hand, the more likely it is to address indicator 
SO2. Furthermore, companies that have signed up to the corruption-specific initiatives EITI, 
COST, PACI and the Wolfsberg Principles are more likely to report on indicator SO2; by 
contrast, such a significant impact cannot be identified for UN Global Compact participation. 
Likewise, CPI scores do not appear to explain coverage levels for this indicator; neither do 
HDI scores, company size or internationalization. 
_______________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
_______________________________ 
 
As can be seen in Table 7, a very similar pattern emerges with regard to the extent to which 
companies have addressed indicator SO3 (Corruption Training). Only mining and banking 
show clear deviations from the reference group electricity. Again, coverage among Eastern 
European companies is significantly lower compared to the reference group of Mediterranean 
European companies. However, three regions show significantly higher coverage than the 
reference group (East Asia, South Asia and South America). As in the previous case, the 
number of other (non-corruption-related) GRI indicators and participation in corruption-
related MSIs are positively related to the coverage of this indicator. Deviating from the 
pattern presented above for indicator SO2 (Corruption Analysis), here both HDI scores and 
internationalization are positively related to the coverage of indicator SO3. 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis for indicator SO4 (Corruption 
Responses). Again, the patterns identified above are to a certain extent replicated for this 
indicator. Banking emerges as the only sector with significantly higher levels of coverage. In 
terms of regional-level differences, Australasian and North American companies show 
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significantly lower coverage than the reference group of Mediterranean European companies. 
In addition, significantly positive relationships can be identified for the number of previous 
GRI G3 sustainability reports, the number of indicators addressed by a company as well as 
for participation in narrow anti-corruption initiatives. By contrast, participation in the UN 
Global Compact does not appear to explain why companies report on their actions taken in 
response to incidents of corruption. Company size as measured by the number of employees 
shows a very small but significant negative impact. 
______________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
_______________________________ 
 
In summary, a largely consistent pattern has emerged from the results of the three regression 
analyses presented above. We were able to identify clear regional-level differences in anti-
corruption reporting. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is supported. However, CPI scores were found 
to have no significant impact on corruption reporting, while HDI scores appear to explain 
coverage levels of corruption-related indicators only in the case of SO3 (corruption training). 
Therefore, the clear regional differences identified in the descriptive analysis presented above 
in Table 4 do not seem to be systematically linked to either the levels of socio-economic 
development or the perceived levels of corruption in these countries. Likewise, clear sector-
level differences in anti-corruption reporting have been identified with regard to all three 
indicators. Thus, hypothesis 2 is also supported. At the same time, an interesting pattern has 
emerged from the analysis in that banking, as a sector that has consistently received high 
Bribe Payers Index (BPI) scores (Transparency International, 2008, 2011) – indicating low 
levels of corruption – is also the sector in which anti-corruption reporting appears to be most 
widespread. In contrast, mining as one of the sectors with persistently low BPI scores 
emerged as the sector in which anti-corruption reporting appeared least widespread. With 
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regard to multi-stakeholder initiatives on corruption, company participation in the UN Global 
Compact is not linked to more extensive reporting on anti-corruption engagement; however, 
participation in the narrow initiatives EITI, COST, PACI or the Wolfsberg Principles does 
have a positive impact on the extent to which companies communicate their anti-corruption-
related activities. Bearing this limitation in mind, the results support hypothesis 3 too. 
 
6.3. Robustness of the Statistical Analysis  
The models used to produce the results presented above were tested for robustness and 
compared to more complex models that take into account random effects relating to the 
company and the year of report publication as well as models that account for interaction 
between narrow and broad anti-corruption initiatives. The random effects of the company 
show that there is greater variability between companies than within any single company, as 
expected. Including the year as a random effect in the logistic regression showed very little 
variation between the years included in the study suggesting that the results are robust over 
the study period. As some company specific information was missing, the availability of such 
information could itself be related to the company and therefore create some bias in the 
results towards those companies that submit more information. This was tested using a factor 
to divide the data into groups according to how much company specific information was 
available and including it in a random effects model. However, the results showed little 
variation between the companies dependent on the amount of company-specific information 
available. Including random effects in the model did not change the fixed effects reported 
through this study. Finally, an interaction term was added between companies which had 
joined the UNGC initiative and any of the four corruption-specific initiatives (EITI, COST, 
PACI and the Wolfsberg Principles) to test the validity of the results with regard to 
hypothesis 3. This interaction term did not significantly improve the model fit and so is 
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deemed unnecessary. We, therefore, argue that the logistic regression models used are 
suitable for this study and that the results of the statistical analysis are robust.  
 
7. Discussion 
The data presented here show that the conceptualization of organizational fields we 
developed in the wake of Smith and Meiksins (1995) has good explanatory power. All three 
types of field level pressures we expected to influence corruption-related coverage could 
indeed be identified. Furthermore, the analysis of corporate reporting on anti-corruption 
engagement concurs with previous studies that corruption is not a popular topic for business 
to discuss (Rodriguez et al., 2006; Svensson, 2005). Although close to the average coverage 
for all 79 indicators of 57%, corruption was only addressed by 60% of all reports for SO2 
(Corruption Analysis), 62% for SO3 (Corruption Training) and 58% for SO4 (Corruption 
Response). By comparison, the core indicator SO1 (Local Community Engagement) was 
addressed by 82% of all reports. As all three corruption indicators are core indicators and thus 
should be addressed by any company producing a GRI G3 report, coverage levels can be 
considered to be relatively low.  
 
One would expect the relationship between analysis, training and response to be reasonably 
uniform across the sample, as the processes of identifying and responding to corruption are 
likely to be similar for all companies. Indeed, average coverage across the three corruption-
related indicators was relatively uniform. Nevertheless, some notable sector- and regional-
level deviations from this overall pattern emerged from the analysis. The construction sector, 
for example, showed the most pronounced gap between SO2 (Corruption Analysis) at 58% 
and SO3 (Corruption Training) at 52% but SO4 (Corruption Response) at only 46%. 
Similarly non-uniform relationships were found in the regional comparison. Here coverage 
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levels in Eastern Europe of SO2 (Corruption Analysis) at 16%, SO3 (Corruption Training) at 
16% and SO4 (Corruption Response) at 29% stand in stark contrast to coverage levels in East 
Asia of SO2 (Corruption Analysis) at 70%, SO3 (Corruption Training) at 84% and SO4 
(Corruption Response) at 70%. 
 
At the regional level, very clear differences emerged from the descriptive analysis. Coverage 
levels of all indicators were low for North American companies (39-63%) and 
Australian/New Zealand companies (48-52%), but especially so for Eastern European ones 
(16-29%). By contrast, the highest scores were achieved by companies in East Asia (70-84%) 
and South Asia (69-85%). Contrary to the literature (Baughn, et al., 2010; Cullen, et al., 
2004; Husted, 1999; Sanyal, 2005), the data did not show a clear systematic link between 
corruption coverage and the level of development or the level of corruption in the country, as 
neither Human Development Index (HDI) nor Corruption Perceptions Index scores (CPI) 
showed a significant relationship. Nevertheless, some of the patterns emerging from the 
analysis appear intuitive. For example, significantly lower coverage of indicator SO4 
(corruption responses) among North American companies compared to the rest of the sample 
might reflect a fear of litigation (as was discussed by Williams, 2004, for the UN Global 
Compact). It should be noted that our sample mainly included very large multinational 
companies, which might be exposed to more complex dynamics in their home and host 
context (cf. Brammer, Pavelin, & Porter, 2009; Spencer & Gomez, 2011) than can be 
captured through home country HDI and CPI scores. 
 
The clearest link that could be identified with regard to regional-level differences in reporting 
on anti-corruption was that coverage of these indicators was significantly related to the 
number of other GRI (non-corruption-related) indicators a company addresses. This 
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relationship was as expected: the more a company reports generally, the more likely it is to 
report on anti-corruption aspects too. This finding may be the result of either of two 
explanations (see also Author 1 et al., 2015). On the one hand, it may indicate a ratchet effect 
in corporate social responsibility (CSR) tools: CSR measures get adopted through proactive 
firms responding to stakeholder expectations, others follow and over time the frontrunners’ 
measures become diffused within their industry through mimetic pressure – until higher 
stakeholder expectations set the cycle in motion again (Bertels & Peloza, 2008). Indeed, 
coverage of SO2 (corruption analysis) and SO4 (corruption training) increases with the 
number of sustainability reports a company has published, therefore reflecting some sort of 
upwards harmonization of reporting over time (Fortanier, et al., 2011). On the other hand, 
many firms in East and South Asia are relative newcomers to corporate sustainability 
reporting, whereas the pioneers are more likely to be found in Europe and North America 
(Chapple & Moon, 2005; Kolk, 2005). It would be conceivable that the pioneers, once they 
found their style, would be reluctant to change their reporting mode irrespective of whether it 
originally included anti-corruption aspects or not.  
 
Differences in coverage are comparatively less pronounced at the level of the seven different 
sectors that were included in the sample. Nevertheless, some stable patterns can be observed, 
with banking consistently showing higher coverage levels than the other sectors, and mining 
showing significantly lower coverage for two out of the three indicators (SO2 and SO3). It is 
interesting to note that this pattern runs counter to the degree to which these sectors are 
commonly thought to be exposed to corrupt activities. In Transparency International’s Bribe 
Payers Index (BPI) 2011, banking received a clearly higher score (indicating a lower level of 
corruption) than the other six sectors included in the sample; in contrast, mining ranges 
among those sectors with a relatively low BPI score and thus represents one of the sectors in 
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which corruption is perceived to be endemic. As such, our findings suggest that the degree to 
which a company is exposed to corrupt practices does not seem to predict whether it publicly 
communicates its anti-corruption engagement. 
 
This finding tallies with the emerging literature on silences in corporate reporting (Buhr, 
1998, 2001; Stittle, 2002). For example, Chwastiak and Young (2003, p. 533) suggest that 
“the ways in which costs are socially constructed under capitalism reduce labor and things to 
their instrumental identity as means to proﬁt”. They go on to show how consumer goods 
companies describe population growth in their annual accounts as opportunity for increased 
sales rather than in terms of ecological challenges of increased water consumption, 
overcrowding, destruction of wildlife habitats or loss of agricultural land. Similarly, annual 
reports of defence contractors discussed the end of the Cold War not as historic step towards 
international peace but as in terms of loss of contracts, sales, and markets. Relatedly, Stittle 
(2002, p. 367) found that corporate attempts to extend the nature and depth of the content of 
their annual reports and accounts have “predominantly resulted in an advertising-oriented 
model, more concerned with favorable self-projection than an objective and open ethical 
assessment of their corporate activities.” 
 
Another important finding concerns the nature of CSR tools. Here our data showed a clear 
difference between the UN Global Compact and the other anti-corruption initiatives, namely 
EITI, PACI, COST and the Wolfsberg Principles. While the latter were significantly related 
to corporate reporting for all three indicators, not a single significant relationship could be 
found for the former. This finding indicates that the more specific a CSR initiative is, the 
greater its success is likely to be. The finding tallies with the argument by Kolk and van 
Tulder (2006) in the context of corporate responses to poverty alleviation that sector-level 
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initiatives compare favourably with those that target a wide range of different companies. Put 
slightly differently, the generalist approach of the Global Compact may work for CSR 
challenges where a clear business case can easily be identified, such as addressing HIV/AIDS 
or tapping into opportunities at the base of the pyramid; corruption, by contrast, may be too 
complex an issue for such a generalist approach to be successful. In this context, it should 
also be born in mind that the UN Global Compact’s 10th Principle on anti-corruption was 
only added in 2004, more than four years after the initial launch of the initiative. 
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper started with the twin observations that corruption is both pervasive and rampant, 
and that the quality of corporate reporting has an important role to play in constraining 
corruption. Hence, the paper investigated whether there are any specific regions or sectors 
where firms are more active than in others in terms of addressing corruption. An examination 
of a sample of 933 sustainability reports, produced according to GRI G3 Reporting 
Guidelines, indeed showed strong regional-level differences. South and East Asian 
companies were found to have particularly high levels of coverage of the GRI indicators on 
corruption; whereas Eastern European countries showed especially low levels. Likewise, 
sector-level differences in reporting were identified, with banks showing significantly higher 
coverage and mining companies reporting less than their peers. 
 
Having said this, no clear link seems to exist between the severity of the problem and the 
extent to which companies report on it. Our study thus stands in the vicinity of the emerging 
literature on silences in corporate reporting (Buhr, 1998, 2001; Chwastiak and Young, 2003; 
Stittle, 2002). We expected firms from countries with a low score (indicating a high level of 
corruption) on the TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) to display a higher level of 
engagement; similarly one might expect firms operating in sectors with a low TI Bribe Payers 
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Index Sector Score (BPI) to have a higher level of engagement. However, neither CPI nor 
BPI scores appear to explain the coverage of corruption-related indicators. While country and 
region of origin appear to determine a company’s general approach to sustainability 
reporting, i.e. the breadth of information provided in these reports, the extent to which 
corruption is perceived to be a problem in a specific context does not appear to determine 
whether a company communicates its anti-corruption engagement or not. At the sectoral 
level, banking as the sector with the highest BPI score within the sample (indicating a low 
level of corruption) also shows the highest coverage levels of anti-corruption indicators. 
Finally, participation in dedicated corruption-related initiatives, such as EITI, COST, PACI 
or the Wolfsberg Principles, appears to be positively related to corruption-related reporting, 
while UN Global Compact participation did not turn out to influence corruption-related 
reporting. Put differently, mono-thematic initiatives that are exclusively dedicated to the issue 
of anti-corruption clearly generate a higher impact than broader initiatives that address 
corruption as part of a wider CSR agenda.  
 
A number of limitations of the paper need to be stated. As with previous studies into 
sustainability reporting, this study has a bias toward relatively large multinational enterprises 
as larger companies are more likely engage in non-financial reporting in the first place. The 
mean number of employees for companies included in this study is 30,856; the median value 
is 5,623. Secondly, there are complex dynamics with regard to the various host contexts in 
which these companies operate, which in turn are likely to influence their anti-corruption 
engagement (Spencer & Gomez, 2011; Spicer, Dunfee, & Bailey, 2004). However, as 
sustainability reporting is typically driven by corporate headquarters, we would nevertheless 
expect a significant impact of a company’s home country environment on its corruption-
related reporting practices. Finally, while the framing of the analysis enabled us to investigate 
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the extent to which companies communicate their anti-corruption engagement, it did not 
allow us to shed light on their actual engagement in anti-corruption measures. Irrespective of 
a company’s anti-corruption efforts, corruption may not least exist as a deviant organizational 
practice. Whilst this is an important limitation, corruption-related reporting by itself should 
serve as an important tool for alleviating corruption as it helps to raise awareness of the issue 
and lends credibility to the reporting company’s actual anti-corruption engagement.  
 
These limitations open up a number of avenues for future research. To start with, future 
research could examine the link between the communication of anti-corruption initiatives and 
actual levels of corporate engagement in this area. Furthermore, the role of MNCs’ host 
country operations could be investigated in more detail than was possible given the diverse 
sample employed in this study. Whilst a company’s degree of internationalization did not 
significantly impact the results of this analysis and therefore host country operations can be 
expected to play a negligible role, previous studies have nonetheless found that a higher 
degree of internationalization or the presence in a particular host country has an impact on 
corporate social performance (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006) or charitable giving (Brammer, et 
al., 2009). 
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Table 1: Illustrative examples of corporate responses to corruption-related indicators SO2, SO3 and SO4 
SO2 – Corruption Analysis 
REN - Redes Energéticas 
Nacionais (2008, p. 87) 
“The Group’s accounts are subject to external audits and legal 
certification as required by law and therefore the company does not 
analyse the risk of corruption in its business units or areas. There have 
been no charges or investigations against Group companies for 
corruption in 2008 (0%).” 
Anglo Coal (2008, 
Appendix p. 8) 
“Anglo American does not tolerate any form of corruption (p. 18). 
Corruption risk is considered within risk assessments conducted for all 
businesses along with many other forms of risk Anglo faces. Internal 
audit procedures also consider the risk of corruption within any process 
that is reviewed, along with the controls to mitigate the risk. If controls 
are not deemed sufficient from a design or operational effectiveness point 
of view then such matters will be reported along with management 
actions. Both the risk management and internal audit procedures are 
aimed at identifying broad risks facing the business relevant to the 
individual scope of the risk assessment and will consider corruption risk 
accordingly. Management remain responsible for the operation of 
controls to minimise the risk of corruption.” 
Watercare Services (2009, 
p. 34) 
“Percentage and total number of business units analysed for risks related 
to corruption: Nil.” 
 
SO3 – Corruption Training 
ACEA SpA (2007, p. 79) “The percentage of workers who have received training on anti-
corruption policies and procedures, estimated, corresponds to around 
12% of the workers – 4,528 human resources – included within the area 
of reporting of the Human Resources part of the Social Section. These 
training activities are illustrated in the Social Section page 129.” 
Horizon Holdings Inc. 
(2008, p. 70) 
“All Horizon Utilities employees are trained in relevant policies and 
procedures that relate to anti-corruption upon hiring, such as Horizon’s 
Whistleblower Policy, Code of Conduct, and Purchasing Policy. “ 
The Australian Gaslight 
Company (2006, p. 43) 
“1,516 colleagues completed privacy training during 2005/2006. 671 
colleagues completed Trade Practices Act training during 2005/2006.” 
 
SO4 – Corruption Responses 
Korea Gas Corporation 
(2008, p. 25) 
“In 2008 integrity evaluation results slightly dropped from 2007 due to 
one bribery case and 2.8 cases of entertaining in the gas supply and sales 
areas. To address these issues, we expanded the scope of our ethics camp 
to include sales and operational facility areas in addition to the previous 
contract & construction areas. We also plan to reinforce our employees’ 
integrity pledge program.” 
Centrica (2006, p. 204) “Centrica has a clear policy on bribery and corruption. All business units 
are required to operate in accordance with this policy. Our analysis 
highlighted no instances of corruption in 2006.” 
Lonmin (2008, p. 42) “The report includes data on the results of whistle-blowing procedures 
introduced by the company as well as the outcomes of corruption-related 
investigations, broken down into the categories ‘No action taken’, 
‘Disciplinary action taken’, ‘Criminal action taken’, and ‘Criminal and 
disciplinary action taken’.” 
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Table 2: Sample employed for analysis 
 
Region Country 
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Total 
Africa South Africa 6 19 3 0 1 8 4 41 
East Asia China 4 0 6 6 0 1 0 17 
East Asia Japan 1 0 1 2 0 4 0 8 
East Asia Philippines 0 2 1 0 2 1 1 7 
East Asia South Korea 3 0 5 12 5 6 0 31 
South Asia India 5 3 2 0 0 1 2 13 
Eastern Europe Hungary 0 0 0 4 2 7 0 13 
Eastern Europe Russia 7 3 10 3 2 0 0 25 
Northern Europe Austria 0 0 2 5 3 6 2 18 
Northern Europe Finland 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 7 
Northern Europe Germany 4 0 0 0 6 9 4 23 
Northern Europe Netherlands 4 0 4 0 5 10 5 28 
Northern Europe Norway 4 0 2 2 0 1 1 10 
Northern Europe Sweden 3 0 0 5 0 0 5 13 
Northern Europe Switzerland 0 3 0 2 3 6 4 18 
Northern Europe UK 1 7 4 0 4 6 11 33 
Mediterranean Europe France 0 0 4 5 6 8 4 27 
Mediterranean Europe Italy 0 0 6 11 22 14 22 75 
Mediterranean Europe Portugal 0 0 2 3 15 9 11 40 
Mediterranean Europe Spain 2 0 6 18 18 58 40 142 
North America Canada 2 10 11 6 4 14 0 47 
North America USA 0 4 15 19 9 4 5 56 
South America Argentina 0 1 0 3 1 5 0 10 
South America Brazil 10 8 4 37 5 7 8 79 
South America Chile 1 15 2 6 8 9 1 42 
South America Colombia 0 1 2 9 3 1 2 18 
South America Mexico 0 3 3 0 1 1 3 11 
South America Peru 0 1 0 7 0 4 1 13 
Australia/NZ Australia 0 18 3 12 11 9 2 55 
Australia/NZ New Zealand 0 0 0 10 3 0 0 13 
Total 63 98 98 188 139 209 138 933 
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Table 3: Indicators used in the analysis 
Indicator Min Max Mean Std. Deviation Indicator Definition Source 
Region       
 Africa 0 1 0.05 0.210 Region of origin (yes/no) www.corporateregister.com/ 
 East Asia 0 1 0.07 0.251  Corporate sustainability reports 
 South Asia 0 1 0.01 0.117   
 Eastern Europe 0 1 0.04 0.198   
 Northern Europe 0 1 0.16 0.368   
 Mediterranean Europe 0 1 0.30 0.460   
 North America 0 1 0.11 0.314   
 South America 0 1 0.19 0.389   
 Australia/NZ 0 1 0.07 0.257   
Sector       
 Industrial Metals 0 1 0.07 0.251 Primary sector affiliation (yes/no) www.corporateregister.com/  
 Mining 0 1 0.11 0.307  Corporate sustainability reports 
 Oil & Gas 0 1 0.11 0.307   
 Electricity 0 1 0.20 0.401   
 Gas, Water & Multi-utilities 0 1 0.15 0.356   
 Banking 0 1 0.22 0.417   
 Construction 0 1 0.15 0.355   
Human Development Index 0.51 0.94 0.813 0.100 Human Development Index score 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-
development-index-hdi 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2.10 9.40 6.301 1.987 Corruption Perceptions Index score www.transparency.org 
Number of Employees 5 1,537,000 30,856.81 101,825.3 Total number of employees 
Thomson Banker/ Corporate sustainability 
reports 
Internationalization 0 1 0.1875 0.29391 
Foreign employees divided by total number 
of employees 
Thomson Banker/ Corporate sustainability 
reports 
Number of GRI G3 Reports 1 4 1.56 0.718 
Number of GRI G3 sustainability reports 
published (including report at stake) 
www.corporateregister.com 
Number of other GRI Indicators 0 76 43.30 17.899 
Number of GRI indicators addressed 
(excluding the three corruption-related 
indicators) 
Corporate sustainability reports 
UNGC Membership 0 1 0.38 0.486 
UN Global Compact membership  
(yes/no) 
www.unglobalcompact.org 
Other Initiatives 0 1 0.15 0.354 
Membership in other corruption-related 
initiatives (yes/no) 
COST (2015); EITI (2015); PACI (2015); 
http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/ 
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Table 4: Coverage of corruption-related indicators – Results of descriptive analysis 
 
    
Total  
Indicators 
Core  
Indicators 
  
Corruption 
Analysis  
(SO2) 
Corruption 
Training  
(SO3) 
Corruption 
Responses  
(SO4) 
  (n) % S.D % S.D   % % % 
Total Sample 933 57.08 23.72 63.75 24.17  59.70 61.84 57.66 
               
Industrial Metals 63 59.45 21.65 67.35 21.15  52.38 60.32 52.38 
Mining 98 62.89 20.31 69.70 20.37  52.04 56.12 60.20 
Oil & Gas 98 59.27 25.15 64.58 25.17  56.12 63.27 61.22 
Electricity 188 61.12 23.49 66.58 23.95  62.77 61.70 57.45 
Gas, Water, Multi-utilities 139 59.50 25.23 65.60 25.31  54.68 56.83 55.40 
Banking 209 52.53 22.33 61.03 23.56  69.86 74.64 65.55 
Construction 138 49.26 23.90 55.72 25.25  56.52 51.45 46.38 
                      
Africa 41 57.37 24.70 63.88 23.89  53.49 46.51 60.47 
East Asia 63 65.38 22.17 68.97 21.09  69.84 84.13 69.84 
South Asia 13 72.83 21.60 83.83 19.46  76.92 84.62 69.23 
Eastern Europe 38 47.97 17.76 52.31 19.36  15.79 15.79 28.95 
Northern Europe 150 48.46 22.33 58.45 24.70  53.33 56.00 53.33 
Mediterranean Europe 284 61.31 22.42 69.04 22.97  72.89 66.90 66.90 
North America 103 47.59 26.02 51.89 26.29  43.69 63.11 38.83 
South America 173 60.85 23.69 66.11 23.70  62.43 65.90 61.27 
Australia/NZ 68 57.40 21.45 62.99 20.73  51.52 51.52 48.48 
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Table 5: Correlation matrix 
 
i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii xix xx xxi xxii xxiii xxiv 
i Human Development Index – 
       
                
ii Corruption Perceptions Index .608*** – 
      
                
iii Number of Employees -.139*** -.118*** – 
     
                
iv Internationalization .179*** .303*** .098** – 
    
                
v Number of G3 Reports .001 -.027 .055 .063 – 
   
                
vi Number of other GRI Indicators -.084* -.113** .037 -.037 .220*** – 
  
                
vii UNGC Membership -.081* -.093** .161*** .151*** .121*** .238*** – 
 
                
viii Other Initiatives .030 .099** .087** .284*** .039 .043 .104** – 
                
ix Africa 
-.328*** -.135*** -.004 .065* -.015 .005 -.110** .111** –                
x East Asia 
-.065* -.205*** .258*** -.136*** -.055 .092** .088** -.088** -.059 –               
xi South Asia 
-.311*** -.172*** -.022 -.054 -.080* .079* -.018 -.023 -.026 -.032 –              
xii Eastern Europe 
-.101** -.313*** .060 -.033 -.002 -.069* -.061 -.085** -.045 -.055 -.024 –             
xiii Northern Europe 
.249*** .489*** -.006 .342*** -.029 -.163*** .017 .090** -.096** -.118*** -.052 -.090** –            
xiv Mediterranean Europe 
.117*** -.028 -.042 -.030 .120*** .114** .046 -.123*** -.145*** -.178*** -.079* -.136*** -.290*** –           
xv North America 
.244*** .287*** -.017 .045 -.051 -.141*** -.122*** .144*** -.077* -.095** -.042 -.073* -.154*** -.233*** –          
xvi South America 
-.370*** -.473*** -.079* -.229*** .004 .077* .131*** .012 -.105** -.128*** -.057 -.098** -.209*** -.316*** -.168*** –         
xvii Australia/NZ 
.247*** .348*** -.061 -.014 -.012 .008 -.096** -.032 -.061 -.074* -.033 -.057 -.121*** -.183*** -.097** -.132*** –        
xviii Industrial Metals 
-.105** -.070* .019 .131*** -.026 .030 .008 .094** .063 .064 .150*** .096** .138*** -.159*** -.068* -.007 -.074* –       
xix Mining 
-.114** .009 -.034 .159*** -.009 .090** -.039 .144*** .275*** -.064* .049 -.018 -.055 -.227*** .035 .097** .124*** -.092** –      
xx Oil & Gas 
.034 -.046 .079* .159*** -.009 .033 .055 .292*** -.025 .089** .019 .106** -.036 -.090** .169*** -.065* -.054 -.092** -.117*** –     
xxi Electricity 
.033 -.091** .014 -.187*** .040 .089** .056 -.156*** -.110** .078* -.060 -.009 -.111** -.117*** .036 .187*** .091** -.135*** -.172*** -.172*** –    
xxii Gas, Water & Multi-utilities 
.153*** .052 -.034 -.145*** -.004 .048 -.112** -.114*** -.078* -.029 -.050 -.025 -.011 .122*** -.023 -.060 .049 -.113** -.143*** -.143*** -.210*** –   
xxiii Banking 
-.132*** .095** .020 -.111** .010 -.117*** .070* -.085** -.020 -.022 -.042 -.020 .031 .142*** -.042 -.078* -.058 -.145*** -.184*** -.184*** -.270*** -.225*** –  
xxiv Construction 
.106** .021 -.057 .120*** -.018 -.138*** -.054 -.053 -.034 -.100** .002 -.086** .081* .230*** -.099** -.082* -.091** -.112** -.143*** -.143*** -.209*** -.174*** -.224*** – 
Note  * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 6: Results of logistic regression (Indicator SO2: Corruption Analysis) 
 
  95% Confidence Interval for exp b 
  B (SE) S.E. Wald Lower exp b Upper 
Included       
Constant -9.14*** 2.37 14.92    
Industrial Metals 0.827 0.428 3.722 0.987 2.286 5.294 
Mining 1.208** 0.370 10.678 1.622 3.348 6.910 
Oil & Gas 0.723 0.390 3.438 0.960 2.060 4.424 
Gas, Water & Multi-utilities 0.645* 0.319 4.079 1.019 1.907 3.566 
Banking -0.933** 0.303 9.468 0.217 0.393 0.713 
Construction -0.182 0.330 0.305 0.437 0.834 1.591 
Africa 0.368 0.532 0.479 0.510 1.445 4.094 
East Asia 0.377 0.425 0.789 0.634 1.458 3.351 
South Asia -0.396 0.891 0.197 0.117 0.673 3.861 
Eastern Europe 2.486*** 0.605 16.867 3.667 12.010 39.332 
Northern Europe 0.016 0.350 0.002 0.512 1.016 2.016 
North America 0.483 0.379 1.627 0.771 1.621 3.408 
South America 0.489 0.334 2.143 0.847 1.631 3.138 
Australia/NZ 0.357 0.447 0.639 0.595 1.429 3.430 
Human Development Index 1.121 1.413 0.630 0.192 3.068 48.928 
Corruption Perceptions Index -0.112 0.091 1.502 0.748 0.894 1.069 
Number of Employees 0.000 0.000 1.906 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Internationalization -0.010 0.374 0.001 0.475 0.990 2.061 
Number of G3 Reports 0.283* 0.134 4.467 1.021 1.327 1.725 
Other GRI Indicators 0.097*** 0.007 190.556 1.087 1.102 1.117 
UNGC Membership -0.134 0.203 0.435 0.588 0.875 1.302 
Other Initiatives -1.241*** 0.298 17.352 0.161 0.289 0.518 
Note R
2
 = 0.37 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), 0.39 (Cox & Snell), 0.52 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(22) = 457.51, p < 0.001.  
* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001. The reference group for Sector is Electricity and for Region 
Mediterranean Europe. 
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Table 7: Results of logistic regression (Indicator SO3: Corruption Training) 
 
  95% Confidence Interval for exp b 
  B (SE) S.E. Wald Lower exp b Upper 
Included       
Constant -2.053 2.298 0.798    
Industrial Metals 0.108 0.436 0.062 1.114 0.474 2.619 
Mining 0.876* 0.363 5.816 2.400 1.178 4.891 
Oil & Gas 0.377 0.376 1.002 1.458 0.697 3.048 
Gas, Water & Multi-utilities 0.105 0.306 0.118 1.111 0.610 2.023 
Banking -1.595*** 0.305 27.308 0.203 0.112 0.369 
Construction -0.142 0.319 0.198 0.867 0.464 1.622 
Africa -0.157 0.533 0.087 0.855 0.301 2.427 
East Asia -2.158*** 0.548 15.517 0.116 0.039 0.338 
South Asia -2.665** 0.994 7.189 0.070 0.010 0.488 
Eastern Europe 1.325* 0.576 5.299 3.763 1.218 11.631 
Northern Europe 0.251 0.348 0.518 1.285 0.649 2.544 
North America -0.710 0.368 3.716 0.492 0.239 1.012 
South America -0.956** 0.350 7.478 0.384 0.194 0.763 
Australia/NZ 0.605 0.441 1.877 1.831 0.771 4.349 
Human Development Index 3.752** 1.404 7.138 42.596 2.717 667.860 
Corruption Perceptions Index 0.084 0.093 0.805 1.087 0.906 1.306 
Number of Employees 0.000 0.000 0.496 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Internationalization 0.842* 0.359 5.493 2.321 1.148 4.695 
Number of G3 Reports 0.226 0.129 3.098 1.254 0.975 1.614 
Number of other GRI Indicators 0.086*** 0.007 166.453 1.090 1.076 1.104 
UNGC Membership -0.009 0.200 0.002 0.991 0.670 1.465 
Other Initiatives -0.890** 0.286 9.646 0.411 0.234 0.720 
Note R
2
 = 0.33 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), 0.35 (Cox & Snell), 0.48 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(22) = 405.13, p < 0.001.       
* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001. The reference group for Sector is Electricity and for Region 
Mediterranean Europe. 
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Table 8: Results of logistic regression (Indicator SO4: Corruption Responses) 
 
  95% Confidence Interval for exp b 
  B (SE) S.E. Wald Lower exp b Upper 
Included       
Constant -7.749** 2.360 10.778    
Industrial Metals 0.774 0.424 3.327 0.944 2.168 4.978 
Mining 0.570 0.378 2.274 0.843 1.768 3.709 
Oil & Gas -0.055 0.395 0.019 0.437 0.947 2.054 
Gas, Water & Multi-utilities 0.263 0.327 0.647 0.685 1.301 2.473 
Banking -0.901** 0.301 8.969 0.225 0.406 0.732 
Construction 0.178 0.333 0.285 0.622 1.195 2.295 
Africa -.509 0.563 0.818 0.199 0.601 1.812 
East Asia -.212 0.433 0.241 0.346 0.809 1.889 
South Asia -.810 0.867 0.872 0.081 0.445 2.435 
Eastern Europe 0.734 0.539 1.854 0.724 2.083 5.992 
Northern Europe 0.217 0.360 0.363 0.613 1.242 2.515 
North America 1.024** 0.391 6.865 1.294 2.783 5.986 
South America -0.385 0.349 1.221 0.343 0.680 1.347 
Australia/NZ 0.985* 0.456 4.676 1.097 2.678 6.539 
Human Development Index 1.245 1.419 0.770 0.215 3.471 55.971 
Corruption Perceptions Index 0.134 0.095 2.000 0.950 1.143 1.376 
Number of Employees 0.000* 0.000 6.413 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Internationalization 0.617 0.383 2.589 0.874 1.853 3.929 
Number of G3 Reports 0.275* 0.133 4.267 1.014 1.316 1.708 
Number of other GRI Indicators 0.104*** 0.007 205.892 1.094 1.109 1.125 
UNGC Membership 0.165 0.202 0.668 0.794 1.180 1.753 
Other Initiatives -0.739* 0.300 6.047 0.265 0.478 0.861 
Note R
2
 = 0.38 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), 0.40 (Cox & Snell), 0.54 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(22) = 476.97, p < 0.001.       
* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001. The reference group for Sector is Electricity and for Region 
Mediterranean Europe. 
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Nb Comment Response 
1 I thank the authors for their responsiveness to my earlier comments. 
 
This is a well written and interesting paper which I have enjoyed 
reviewing and which will be enjoyed by readers of Accounting Forum 
in coming years. 
Thank you very much for your helpful and constructive comments during 
the review process. 
1.1 (1) It strikes me re-reading your paper that it may fit the embryonic 
literature on silence. The greater the likelihood of corruption the more 
silent are companies in communicating their anti-corruption 
engagement. A reference to the literature on silence and one or two 
citations might position your paper well (e.g., Buhr, 1998, 2001, 
Chwastiak and Young, 2003; Stittle 2002). 
Thank you for this valuable suggestion. We now refer to this emerging body 
of literature in the discussion section and briefly in the conclusions.  
 
1.2 (2) Page 17, Line 22: Where did you source the data for the Human 
Development Index scores? 
We have added this reference (UNDP, 2015). 
1.3 (3) Page 22, Line 60: The acronym BPI is used on page 22 and page 
23 but what BPI stands for is not explained until page 28. 
We now introduce the acronym on page 15 (as the Bribe Payers Index is 
mentioned here for the first time). 
1.4 (4) References: can you double check the references please. For 
example, the reference Sikka (2010) does not follow the style 
guidelines of Accounting Forum. 
Apologies for this oversight. We have reformatted Sikka (2010) and 
carefully checked the reference list. 
1.5 (5) Table 1: some of the extracts do not look accurate. For example, 
".corruption In 2008- 0%". Is "In" capitalised in the original? Also "- 
0%" looks odd. For example, ""Anglo American's does" is there a 
word missing here? I don't understand the possessive "American's". 
The layout of the illustrative example from ACEA's doesn't look right. 
We have corrected these. They were typographical errors in the original 
reports. We changed them gently to what (we can safely assume) the 
authors would have written had they been aware of having made an error. 
We don’t think there is an apostrophe needed in “All Horizon Utilities 
employees …”. We would not put one either in e.g. “all Shell employees 
*Response to Reviewers
Are there hard returns in the example that need to be removed? For 
example, "All Horizon Utilities [NO APOSTROPHOHE 
INDICATING THE POSSESSIVE?] employees." 
…” 
1.6 (6) Table 2: How is Switzerland in Northern Europe? Such classifications, although useful, are sometimes not straightforward. 
While we do accept your point, we decided not to change the classification 
of Switzerland. Pragmatically, a fuller category title like “Northern and 
Central Europe” would have made the text more unwieldy. Also, 
geographically speaking most of Switzerland is north of the Alps rather than 
south of them. 
1.7 (7) Table 2/Table 4/Table 5 & Table 3: The nine regions are labelled 
and sequenced differently in Table 2 and Table 3.  The different 
labelling will confuse some readers. The variation in sequencing is 
annoying for readers. This comment also applies to subsequent tables. 
We have changed labels and sequencing in all tables in order to address the 
points you have raised. 
1.8 (8) Table 2 & Table 4 & Table 5: why are the seven industrial sectors 
sequenced differently in Table 4 compared with Table 2? This 
comment also applies to subsequent tables. 
We have changed labels and sequencing in all tables in order to address the 
points you have raised. 
1.9 (9) Table 2 and Table 4: Why don't the numbers tally between Table 2 
and Table 4? For example, Africa Table 2 41 Table 4 43; For 
example, Australia/NZ Table 2 68 Table 4 66, etc? 
Apologies – this has now been corrected in Table 4. Labels and subsample 
sizes had been copied from a previous version of that table – including a 
coding error that has been corrected in the meantime. We have carefully 
checked all Tables and data as part of the revisions. 
1.10 (10) Table 2 and Table 5: why are the variables sequenced differently 
in Table 5? 
We have changed labels and sequencing in all tables in order to address the 
points you have raised. 
1.11 (11) Table 5 and Table 6/Table 7/ Table 8: why are the variables 
sequenced differently in Table 5 and Table 6/Table 7/ Table 8? 
We have changed labels and sequencing in all tables in order to address the 
points you have raised. 
1.12 (12) Table 6/Table 7/ Table 8: Will all readers understand what is 
meant by "CI" and "exp b" in this table? 
Thank you for this comment. ‘CI’ stands for confidence interval; we have 
written this out in the revised version. ‘exp b’ stands for the exponentiation 
of coefficient B (which is also listed in Tables 6-8). Both of these are 
commonly reported elements of logistic regression analysis. 
 
1.13 (13) In order to add value to the authors from my review, I note a few 
gremlins I spotted as I read the paper as follows (I recommend a final 
thorough proofread of the paper): 
Thank you very much for your careful reading of the manuscript. We have 
addressed all of these points and carefully proofread the manuscript. 
1.13.1 Page 4, Line 20: "Tanzi, 1995: [REPLACE COLON WITH "p."] 161; 
search paper for colons and other similar incidents 
This has been corrected. 
1.13.2 Page 6, Line 14: "Corruption is an important topic for accounting and 
accounting scholars." 
This has been corrected: “Corruption is an important topic for management 
and accounting scholars”. 
1.13.3 Page 7, Line 18: A third group of studies statistically examines the 
link between the level of corruption in a country and various socio-
economic and cultural factors but also [INCLUDING?] the quality of 
accounting. 
We have changed this sentence accordingly. 
1.13.4 Page 10, Line 25-27: "note, however, the critique that there may be a 
Western bias in defining and measuring corruption, see e.g. de Maria, 
2008)". Is this phrase repeated word for word in Footnote 2? 
Thank you for this point which has also been corrected – we have deleted 
the footnote. 
1.13.5 Page 12, Line 50: "Such geographic luck provides rent-seeking 
corrupt government [GOVERNMENTS PLURAL?]" 
This has been corrected. 
1.13.6 Page 17, Line 31: "Both of aspects." IS THERE A WORD MISSING 
HERE? 
This has been changed into: “Both of these aspects”. 
 
 
